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BEING PRAGMATIC ABOUT FORENSIC
LINGUISTICS
Edward K. Cheng*
If my late colleague Margaret Berger taught me anything
about evidence, it was that the field seldom yields easy answers.
After all, law is necessarily a pragmatic discipline, especially
when it comes to matters of proof. Courts must make their best
decisions given the available evidence. They have neither the
luxury of waiting for better, nor the ability to conjure up,
evidence (or new technologies) that they wished they had.
Scholars, by contrast, are naturally attracted to the ideal,
sometimes like moths to a flame. Ideals reflect the values and
commitments of our society, and they provide the goals that
inspire and guide research. But when assessing a new field like
forensic linguistics as a legal academic, one needs to carefully
separate the ideal from the pragmatic. For when it comes to real
cases, evidence law can ill afford to allow the perfect to be the
enemy of the good.
Bearing this admonition firmly in mind, this article aims to
provide some legal context to the Authorship Attribution
Workshop (“conference”). In particular, I want to offer some
pragmatic observations on what courts will likely demand of
forensic linguistics experts1 and tentatively suggest what the field
should aspire to in both the short and long run.

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; Ph.D. Candidate, Department of
Statistics, Columbia University. Thanks to Larry Solan for organizing this
remarkably interdisciplinary conference and to Dashiell Renaud for research
assistance.
1
While “forensic linguistics” may encompass a broader set of
techniques, I will use the term synonymously with the use of linguistic
methods for purposes of attributing authorship, the focus of the conference.
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I. DAUBERT

No discussion of scientific evidence—at least no discussion
of scientific evidence in the United States—can begin without
2
referencing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Daubert
establishes a five-factor test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence: i) falsifiability and testing; ii) publication and peer
review; iii) error rates; iv) standards; and v) general
acceptance.3 Unfortunately, applying these factors to many of the
forensic linguistic methods presented at this conference
immediately raises concerns. The methods do not have rigid
procedures that have been tested or have known error rates.
Excepting the contributions in this issue of the Journal of Law
and Policy, few have ever been published. And, almost by
definition, since forensic linguistics is an emerging field, many
techniques lack general acceptance.
The principal issue is not that forensic linguistic methods are
junk. Rather, the problem is that forensic linguistic methods often
change from one case to another to account for case-specific
contours: Malcolm Coulthard’s case study involved selecting
4
certain misspellings and word choices made over e-mail, while
Tim Grant’s study explored the peculiar grammar of text
messaging.5 The result is a “moving target,” and while moving
targets are not necessarily bad as a theoretical matter, they are a
big problem for the Daubert test, which envisions standardized,
broadly applicable (and broadly applied) techniques.
Does this mismatch spell doom for the field? Will forensic
linguists thus inevitably face widespread opposition and
exclusion by judges? Emphatically no. As many in the scientific
evidence community have long observed, Daubert in practice
fundamentally differs from Daubert in theory. In real life, courts
often treat the Daubert factors more as incantation than as actual

2

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See id. at 593–94.
4
Malcolm Coulthard, On Admissible Linguistic Evidence, 21 J.L. &
POL’Y 441 (2013).
5
Tim Grant, TXT 4N6: Method, Consistency, and Distinctiveness in the
Analysis of SMS Text Messages, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 467 (2013).
3
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requirements.6 What they really impose is an impressionistic
type of scrutiny, giving the expert testimony a “hard look” for
intellectual rigor, but nothing more.
Courts have gravitated toward hard-look scrutiny not out of
7
laziness or ignorance but out of pragmatism. The Daubert case
itself arose in the pharmaceutical context, where large datasets,
standardized treatments, and statistical studies reign. What the
Daubert test demands is thus perfectly reasonable in that context.
In other contexts, however, useful expertise exists in the absence
of such data. For example, like forensic linguists, accident
reconstruction experts also customize their analyses based on case
specifics. This customization again means little standardization or
statistical justification. Yet, courts have regularly admitted
reconstruction experts under hard-look review.8
The contours of this hard-look test seem to boil down to
three somewhat related inquires. First, is the expert overselling
the power of his technique? Courts display little patience with
expert grandstanding, strongly preferring ones who carefully
delineate what their techniques can and cannot do.9 Second, does
the expert provide a rational explanation for how the technique
works? Daubert is in many ways an emphatic rejection of ipse
dixit or say-so testimony.10 Even though jurors lack technical
expertise, Daubert tasks them with engaged, reasoned, critical
decision making. Blind deference to the authority of a well6

Cf. 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 43:10, at 782 (2012) (“As a
result, the Daubert factors have become something akin to incantation in the
structural engineering context, rather than a roadmap for rigorous inquiry.”).
7
But see Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National
Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 454–55 (2001) (suggesting that many state court
judges may not fully understand the Daubert factors).
8
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 6, § 44:10, at 810 (“[C]ourts take a
pragmatic view, admitting [accident reconstruction] testimony even when
testing is absent or is otherwise imperfect or flawed.”).
9
See id. §§ 45:4–7 (discussing flaws in expert economic analyses).
10
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to
admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert.”).
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credentialed expert simply will not do.11 Finally, is the expert
willing to acknowledge and address criticisms of his technique?
Overdefensiveness or blithely ignoring well-founded objections
often betrays a certain lack of understanding, another worthy
12
ground for exclusion.
Viewed in this light, there is little surprise that courts have
generally permitted the linguists at this conference to testify in
court,13 and this trend will likely continue. At least within this
hand-picked subpopulation, the experts do not oversell their wares
and carefully circumscribe the conditions under which their
methods apply. They provide reasoned explanations, and I suppose
the mere fact of their attendance at this conference demonstrates a
profound commitment to taking objections seriously.
II. A (LONG-TERM) WISH LIST
As argued above, courts are likely to admit forensic
linguistics as it currently stands. But presumably, this
conference’s focus is not merely this basic doctrinal question.
Rather, Larry Solan’s vision was to consider what forensic
linguistics might become and how the field might best aid the
legal system.14 In this aspirational vein, let us therefore consider
11

See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law
Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131 (1993)
(discussing whether the role of experts is to educate the jury or to arrive at
conclusions to which a jury defers).
12
Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 6, § 43:14, at 786–87 (discussing the
courts’ use of “robustness tests,” which test how well an expert addresses
alternative theories or contrary evidence, in the structural engineering
context).
13
Perhaps the most striking example is Carole Chaski, who reports
having been allowed to testify in a Frye state even after noting repeatedly that
her method was experimental and still under development, a condition clearly
at odds with her methods being “generally accepted”—the sole criterion for
admissibility under a Frye test. See Carole Chaski, Best Practices and
Admissibility of Forensic Author Identification, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 333, 358
(2013). The suspicion, naturally, is that even in Frye jurisdictions, what
matters to courts is not the headcount associated with a method but the
intellectual rigor of the method as probed by the hard-look test.
14
Lawrence Solan, Intuition Versus Algorithm: The Case of Forensic
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a “wish list” of attributes that the law might want from the field.
In an ideal world, we would probably like forensic linguistic
analysis to have:
 a widely adopted, predefined algorithm (preferably
automated);
 a large, random sample of known exemplars
(preferably subclassified by topic and genre); and
 a well-understood theoretical underpinning.
These goals are not my brainchild but have been implicit in
many comments, criticisms, caveats, and apologies heard
throughout this conference. We all seem to wish that forensic
linguistics had fewer ad hoc, case-specific methods so that we
could have more rigorous testing and known error rates. We
wish that we had a larger and more detailed set of training data
so that we could be more confident about external validity. And
finally, the linguists, although perhaps not the computational
ones, would feel more comfortable if the methods and results
were better rooted in linguistic theory.
A moment’s reflection suggests the loftiness of these goals.
Only one forensic method arguably satisfies them all—DNA.
DNA has a widely adopted, predefined, largely automated
algorithm; a large, random sample of known exemplars; and a
well-understood theoretical underpinning. That is not to say that
its history and development were without controversy,15 but that
is where matters stand today. No other forensic field can make
such claims.
Juxtaposed to DNA, forensic linguistics clearly has a long
way to go. Nearly all of the procedures and algorithms
presented at this conference involve some degree of ad hoc
expert tweaking and customization, particularly those used for
short writing samples. The computational procedures that
Authorship Attribution, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 551 (2013).
15
For example, forensic DNA evidence generated two National Academy
of Sciences reports in rapid succession. The first, published in 1992, failed to
resolve controversies that were later largely put to rest in the second,
published in 1996. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 10–11 (1996) (“[W]e agree with many
recommendations of the earlier [report] but disagree with others.”).
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involve less tweaking ideally require a large, random sample of
exemplars that currently does not exist. And in almost all cases,
the theoretical underpinning for the results is opaque. For
example, participants offered some off-the-cuff rationales for
why n-grams16 or the other machine learning methods work, but
no one really understands what is going on.
These ultimate goals are surely daunting, but we should be
encouraged that the leaders in the forensic linguistics community
have set their sights correctly on the prize.
III. SHORT-TERM ASPIRATIONS
With the long-term goals set, let us consider what courts
might demand from forensic linguistics in the short term. As I
mentioned in the introduction, the legal system must be more
pragmatic in the short term, so what exactly should it demand?
In this context, Daubert hard-look review in conjunction with
the other evidentiary rules provides a convenient short-term
checklist for forensic linguists.
1. The testimony must add value. This requirement is at the
heart of the relevance standard established by Rule 40117 and the
“help the trier of fact” standard governing experts under Rule
702.18 At the very minimum, forensic linguists should be more
than highly credentialed window dressing on common sense.
They must add substantive value.
This requirement appears easily met, especially when the
expert moves beyond obvious identifying features such as
misspellings or unusual word choices. For example, techniques
exploiting syntactic structure, choice of function words or
grammar, or n-grams clearly represent ideas beyond the ken of
the average (or even sophisticated) juror.

16

An n-gram is a sequence of n adjacent items—words, phrases, or
characters—from a given text, forming the basis for analysis.
17
FED. R. EVID. 401.
18
FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (“A witness who is qualified as an expert . . .
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”).
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2. The testimony must enlighten more than distort or confuse.
This second requirement has both evidentiary and statistical
inspirations. Evidentiarily speaking, Rule 403 requires that the
probative value of evidence not be substantially outweighed by
its potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.19 Statistically speaking, George Box’s wellknown maxim sums up the problem in a nutshell: “[A]ll models
20
are wrong, but some are useful.”
On this score, somewhat counterintuitively, the trend toward
quantitative and statistical measures may be more worrisome
than more traditional, off-the-cuff qualitative methods. To be
sure, as Jay Koehler notes, qualitative methods present hazards
through loaded and vague words like “match” and
“consistent.”21 But jurors are at least more comfortable weighing
that kind of evidence, and attorneys educated about these issues
can effectively attack them.
Statistical measures of linguistic similarity are another
matter. Statistical methods always have underlying assumptions
and potential problems, and asking jurors (or even opposing
counsel) to ferret out the distortions created by flawed models is
unrealistic. Unless the method is so well-trodden and wellaccepted that a jury can essentially use its results uncritically, I
worry that statistical models in this context may distort more
than illuminate.
3. The testimony must be sufficiently transparent to permit
reasoned decision making. This third requirement originates
from Daubert’s hard-look test, as well as Rule 702’s demand
that a conclusion not rest solely on the ipse dixit of an expert.22
All of the experts at this conference would presumably meet
this criterion with ease, since they have all cogently explained
and defended their methods. I can envision two instances,
however, in which forensic linguistic testimony could run afoul
19

FED. R. EVID. 403.
GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODELBUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987).
21
Jonathan J. Koehler, Linguistic Confusion in Court: Evidence from the
Forensic Sciences, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 515, 534 (2013).
22
FED. R. EVID. 702; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
146 (1997).
20
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of this requirement. The first is the purely impressionistic
linguist, who relies solely on his or her “training and
experience.” Lest this example seem like a straw man, let me
note that authentication attempts in other fields frequently
proceed along these lines. For example, art experts studying the
Getty kouros reported feeling an inexplicable revulsion upon
first seeing the statue, and these gut feelings often provided a
foundation for their assessment that the statue was a fake.23 Such
intuitions are surely not nonsense, and arguably the legal system
should prefer an art expert’s opinion over the average juror’s,
but Daubert makes clear that ipse dixit, “blink”-type testimony
does not make the cut.24
The second potentially problematic instance is where a
machine-learning algorithm arrives at an empirically successful
identification rule (i.e., high accuracy), but researchers have
25
little idea why it works as a matter of substantive theory. With
its emphasis on predictive accuracy over interpretability,
machine learning tends toward such black boxes, and while I
personally sympathize with the approach, the legal system with
its emphasis on reasoned decision making typically does not.
4. The method must have some proven empirical validity.
This final requirement is based again on the text of Rule 70226
but may be the most difficult short-term aspiration for the field.
The sine qua non of empirical validity is testing. For some of
the data-intensive, quantitative methods presented at this
conference, a focus on testing is practically inherent. But

23

Georgios Dontas, The Getty Kouros: A Look at Its Artistic Defects and
Incongruities, in THE GETTY KOUROS COLLOQUIUM 37, 37 (Angeliki Kokkou
ed., Alex Doumas trans., 1993) (“In the controversy regarding the
authenticity of the Getty kouros a factor that must be taken into account is, in
my opinion, the unfavourable feeling it arouses at the very first glance.”); see
also MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 3–8 (2005) (discussing the Getty kouros).
24
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1993).
25
See generally Leo Breiman, Statistical Modeling: The Two Cultures,
16 STAT. SCI. 199 (2001) (discussing the two cultures of statistics: one
focused on explanation, and the other on prediction).
26
FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert . . . may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: . . . (c) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods . . . .”).
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methods such as those proposed by Coulthard27 or Grant,28 which
are more qualitative, subjective, or case-specific, will require
experts to embrace proficiency testing and out-of-sample testing
more affirmatively.
For qualitative linguistic experts, courts should demand
proficiency testing—tests of ability involving known problems
given under blinded conditions.29 Such testing is undoubtedly no
fun for the experts involved. The experts open themselves up to
attack if the testing turns out badly, and the risk of endangering
a lucrative line of business creates substantial disincentives to
participate. Experts will thus require judicial prodding, for
without such information about accuracy rates, jurors cannot
assess the probative value of an expert’s conclusions.
For case-customized models, any reported accuracy rates
must be out-of-sample accuracy rates. Constructing models that
merely fit the data on hand is one thing; successfully predicting
future data is an entirely different matter. Tailoring methods or
models to a specific case is a time-honored recipe for creating
overfitted models, which explain the current dataset well but
handle future datasets poorly. To get proper accuracy rates,
researchers must divide their dataset into training and testing
sets. Models should be developed only with the training set, and
validation should be done only with the separate testing set.
Some of the conference papers used out-of-sample testing, while
others either did not or were unclear.30
Finally, part and parcel of testing is the establishment of
standardized procedures. As the forensic linguistics field
matures, it will have to sacrifice some of its flexibility for
27

Coulthard, supra note 4.
Grant, supra note 5.
29
Proficiency testing has been proposed as the solution to Daubert in
other contexts involving subjective, expert-dependent determinations, such as
fingerprints. E.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future
of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1217–33 (2009).
30
E.g., Shlomo Argamon & Moshe Koppel, A Systemic Functional
Approach to Automated Authorship Analysis, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 299, 313 tbl.1
(2013) (uses cross-validation); Chaski, supra note 13, at 353 tbl.3 (uses
cross-validation); Coulthard, supra note 4 (does not use cross validation);
Grant, supra note 5 (does not use cross-validation).
28

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

550

standardization, both across cases and ultimately across experts.
Standardization of the feature set used in forensic linguistic
analysis is imperative if we are to have established error rates. It
is also the only way to avoid confirmation bias. Without a
predefined algorithm, an expert runs the significant risk of
preferencing aspects that confirm her initial hypothesis over
those that disprove it.31
Going forward, the challenge for forensic linguists will be to
develop a method that relies less on the expertise of the
individual linguist—at least on an everyday basis. The heavy
lifting in developing an authorship attribution technique should
occur in the lab, long before it is applied in a legal case. By the
time it is applied for legal consequence, the application of the
method should be largely mechanical.
CONCLUSION
Ours is an extremely exciting time for forensic linguistics.
The field faces profound challenges in its attempt to meet the
ideals and goals set by Daubert, and much work remains to be
done. Yet, with so many motivated and intellectually engaged
scholars and researchers, we can be very hopeful that progress
will be steadily made.
More broadly, as a legal observer, I am curious to see how
the field of forensic linguistics ultimately develops. Unlike most
forensic fields, which arose long before the invention of DNA
typing and the decision in Daubert, forensic linguistics will
blossom within a modern scientific evidence framework. It will
thus provide a unique opportunity to observe how the various
actors and modern incentives interact. More importantly, it will
help evidence scholars determine whether all the trouble
collectively known as Daubert is really worth the candle.
31

In this context, I am reminded of the modus operandi arguments made
by the prosecution in United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 1995), a
case involving the purported “signature” of a bomber. The prosecution
pointed to several common bomb parts in its argument that two bombs were
constructed by the defendant. The dissent rightly wondered why one should
emphasize the similarities between the two bombs rather than several
significant dissimilarities. Id. at 64 (Torruella, J., dissenting).

